Ahearn: The Marian Controversy and Hume’s Use of Original Sources
In 1759, David Hume published the third installment of his History of England, in which his unsympathetic view of Mary Queen of Scots caused an outcry among his peers. Known as the “Marian controversy” to Edinburgh literati, debates around Mary’s vices and virtues created a clear partisan divide in Scotland’s eighteenth-century public sphere: to Jacobite sympathizers, Mary represented a maternal patron saint of the House of Stuart; to Whig historians, Mary’s sensationalized memory did not fit in the progress narrative they imagined for their “British” nation. Hume’s involvement in the Marian controversy exhibits a level of original source research traditionally not attributed to Hume’s work. Since his History was first published in 1754, Hume’s critics have either attacked its lack of sources or shrugged them off as unimportant, arguing that Hume’s project was not to create an original history but to disentangle the prejudiced work of earlier historians. This research shows how, contrary to these ingrained perspectives, Hume thoroughly analyzed and interpreted original sources to create an authentic historical inquiry.
Besser: Learning from the Stoic Sage: The influence of Stoicism on Hume’s moral ideal
While it’s tempting to see Hume as the anti-Stoic, several Hume scholars suggest there’s more similarity between Hume and the Stoics than this disagreement suggests, pointing in particular to their respective views of human excellence.Driving this point of similarity is Hume’s essay “The Stoic”, where he discusses the Stoic model of human excellence, the sage. Hume’s presentation of the sage attributes to him many features found within Hume’s own model of human excellence. In this paper, I’ll explore this
point of similarity, showing it extends further than has been previously suggested. I’ll argue that, at least with respect to their moral theories, far from being the anti-Stoic, Hume rather very well might be a Stoic who disagrees with one key thesis
Côté: Hume on Cultivated Nature and the Artificial Virtues
This paper reflects on the relationship between first and second nature in Hume’s philosophy. In the first part, I argue that Hume has a highly original conception of culture, which is not the process by which rational representations come to govern passions, but a naturally induced, self-enforcing process of refinement, redirection and enlargement of natural tendencies – mediated by reason, the imagination, and sympathy. In the second part, I argue that the cultivation process remains limited by core, unpliable human tendencies. In the final part of the paper, I explore the type of relationship artificial standards of
virtue maintain with first natural tendencies and discuss various interpretations of Hume’s attempt to ground morality on first-natural tendencies. Against McDowell, I contend that the subordination of normative claims to first-natural facts does not imply taking moral problems from the “dehumanized stance” of natural sciences, and that Humeans are well-situated to “open the authority of nature to question”. However, I maintain that first natural tendencies, and especially sympathy, cannot play the proper “vindicatory” role with regard to second-natural moral standards, suggested by David Wiggins. I use Hume’s account of one specific artificial virtue – feminine chastity – as a test case for these claims. I propose a reading in which self-love, sympathy, and other first-natural tendencies are strictly amoral: they do not guarantee emancipation or moral improvement in a strong sense. What they do is to explain a certain consensual moral order, or socio-affective equilibrium, at a given moment in history. I finally suggest that Hume’s notion of cultivated morality calls for a “skeptical sentimentalism”.
Cottrell: Empiricism and Naturalism in Hume’s philosophy
Hume’s philosophy weaves together three strands: empiricism, scepticism, and naturalism. Famously, Norman Kemp Smith asked how the sceptical and naturalistic strands fit together, for they seem to be in tension. Here, I pose a different question: how are we to understand the relation between the empiricist and naturalistic strands in Hume’s philosophy. I argue that they, too, are in tension, especially in Hume’s early Treatise of Human Nature. I also argue that, over the course of his career, Hume starts to
address this problem by retreating from empiricism, and moving towards a naturalistic nativism. Why should his empiricism cede ground to his naturalism, and not the other way round? I venture that his longstanding commitment to the teleology of the mental, together with his commitment to eliminating final causation, push him towards nativism.
Dunlop: A. J. Ayer on the Common-Sense Theory of the Physical World
This paper considers how A. J. Ayer’s reading of Treatise 1.4.2 resolves some interpretive puzzles. Hume claims that on the basis of the constancy and coherence of perceptions, we come to conceive perceptions, which we do not at first distinguish from objects, as existing when unperceived. It is unclear whether the positing of physical objects belongs to philosophy or to ordinary empirical cognition, and also unclear how constancy relates to coherence. I argue that low-level cognitive processes can take us far along, but not all the way, in attaining thought of enduring objects. I suggest that where these resources run out, we should draw on the parallel between Hume’s accounts of constancy and coherence, so even the account based on constancy involves sophisticated theorizing. Ayer’s reading makes it reasonable to attribute such sophistication to “the vulgar”. In the first place, the view that philosophy is restricted to analysis, which Ayer traces to Hume, implies that the conceptual relationships it elaborates are already present in ordinary empirical cognition. In the second place, Ayer gives a plausible source for this sophistication: the learning of language.
Galvagni: Hume and Midgley: Human Nature, Sentiment, and Morality
British philosopher Mary Midgley (1919–2018) has gained renewed attention among historians of philosophy due to her membership in the so-called Oxford Wartime Quartet. Midgley’s philosophy, like those of her more famous Oxford companions (Anscombe, Foot and Murdoch) has been associated
with a revival of ancient virtue ethics. Yet, Midgley’s view of human nature shares some important underexplored similarities with that of David Hume, whose conception of morality is explicitly discussed by Midgley and presents interesting points of connection to hers. This paper explores some of these connections. In section 1, I conduct some exploratory work to highlight Hume and Midgley’s common interest for human nature and its importance for the development of moral philosophy. In section 2, I stress the importance of sentiment in their moral philosophy. In section 3, I propose to read Midgley as developing a form of moral theory that interestingly combines Aristotelian elements with distinctively modern elements taken from Hume. The result is twofold. On the one hand, the paper contributes to (1) discover another instance of Hume’s influence in the history of analytic philosophy. On the other hand, it also helps us to (2) reimagine virtue ethics beyond the limits of a neo-Aristotelian approach.
Goldhaber: Mechanisms for Hume’s Skepticism: Doxastic and Emotional
What happens to a mind which embraces skepticism? On both classical and contemporary accounts, the mind suspends judgment about the matters which the skepticism calls into doubt. For Hume, such widespread suspension of judgment can occur only temporarily, if at all. He claims that skepticism’s typical and more enduring effect is weaker; it only lowers the vivacity of, and so our confidence in, our
beliefs, typically leaving commonplace beliefs intact. The resources of Hume’s associationism offer at least two explanatory mechanisms for why skepticism has this effect, one doxastic and one emotional. In the doxastic mechanism, causal reasoning about our own errors in reasoning decreases the vivacity of beliefs formed through reasoning. In the emotional mechanism, appreciating our cognitive errors diminishes our pride, and in turn the vivacity of any beliefs which might otherwise be augmented by our
pride. Understanding these mechanisms not only resolves exegetical puzzles about Hume’s sometimes flippant attitudes toward skepticism. It also provides us with a psychologically rich picture of how minds or cognitive models might self-correct without exaggeration. I close by highlighting a tension between Hume’s mechanisms for skepticism and his attempts at employing his theory of ideas to debunk dogmatic metaphysics and theology.
Inoue: Hume’s treatment of the direct passions in the Treatise
Hume employs Parts 1 and 2 of Book II of the Treatise for the discussion of the indirect passions, and establishes the foundation of the system of the passions in terms of the double relation of impressions and ideas from which the passion arises. In Part 3 of Book II, he discusses the direct passions, and explains how they move us to act on the external objects. Regarding Hume’s treatment of the
direct passions, there is much interpretative and philosophical study left to be done, because scholarships are mostly on the role of the direct passions as motives, but rarely on their nature and other functions. The aim of this paper is to establish that the direct passions are two kinds, instinctual and non-instinctual, and give a sketch of the structure of Hume’s account of the direct passions.
Kim: Two Influences of General Rules in Hume’s Treatise
The “two sorts of rules” interpretation suggests that Hume identifies two types of rules to address the normativity problem within his belief system. One type is formed rashly under the influence of custom on the imagination, while the other is shaped reflectively by the influence of custom on the understanding. Unlike the former, the latter is normative. However, I argue that the “reflective rules”
cannot independently provide normativity. When we apply “reflective rules” to particular cases, we encounter the normativity problem again due to the “complication of circumstances”: “all the rules … are very easy in their invention, but extremely difficult in their application.” In my view, this leads to the issue of the “two influences of general rules.” To clarify this issue, it is important to note that Hume’s “experimental method of reasoning” comprises two stages. The analysis stage involves establishing general rules from particular examples, while the synthesis stage applies these established general rules
to further examples. The “two sorts of rules” pertain to the diminution of “the union,” one source of
unphilosophical probability that occurs in the analysis stage, whereas the “two influences of general rules” relate to the diminution of “the resemblance,” another source of unphilosophical probability that occurs in the synthesis stage.
Melamedoff: Mary Shepherd’s Objection to Hume’s Fork
Hume’s fork says that all propositions can be divided into matters of fact and relations of ideas. After drawing this distinction in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume argues that only relations of ideas can be known demonstratively, because the contrary of any matter of fact is always possible. Mary Shepherd rejects this distinction in her 1824 An Essay Concerning the Relation of Cause and Effect, claiming that matters of fact can be demonstrated just like relations of ideas. The objection she raises against Hume’s fork is puzzling, as she makes reference to a variety of her metaphysical views without a clear argumentative structure. In this essay I analyze Shepherd’s objection in the context of her metaphysical system, showing that it contains a coherent and salient argument against Hume. Shepherd’s objection hinges on her analysis of empirical matters of fact as relational propositions, in
contrast with Hume’s atomic conception of facts. I argue that this dispute over Hume’s fork is rooted in a deeper ontological disagreement between atomistic and relational conceptions of objects. Hume’s atomistic metaphysical starting point makes his fork seem self-evident, while Shepherd’s relationalism renders the fork incoherent.
Monteleone: Virtue, Sex, and Reputation: Hume and Wollstonecraft on Chastity and Modesty
This paper argues that Hume and Wollstonecraft share a conception of sexual virtues as artificial. Both
acknowledge that chastity and modesty arise from a gender power imbalance and contribute to its reproduction. Both identify shame and the fear of losing one’s reputation as playing a crucial role in reinforcing such attitudes, whose stability depends on their being ‘naturalized’ as feminine. While Hume focuses his analysis on the moral psychology of this phenomenon, Wollstonecraft points at its detrimental political and ethical effects. She argues that sexual virtues are majorly responsible of the subjection of women, while Hume takes them to be of public interest. The analysis will compare Hume and Wollstonecraft’s accounts of the intertwining of sex, virtue, manners and reputation. The argument will be divided into two sections: the first will concern Hume’s account of sexual virtues in his Treatise of Human Nature; the second will juxtapose such account to Wollstonecraft’s critique of feminine virtues in
her Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Such comparison aims to highlight how the radicality of Wollstonecraft’s theses on the depths of women’s oppression, which conditions their affective and psychological sphere, can be better understood through the lenses of Hume’s moral philosophy.
Narváez Cano: Hume and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
The principle of sufficient reason (PSR), the principle according to which everything has an explanation, is one of those principles that seems hard to reject if one is seriously committed to understanding why things happen in the way they happen. When something happens, it is normally taken for granted that something else produced it, and this assumption is grounded in the PSR. On the contrary, a rejection of this principle suggests that things, or at least some things, happen in the way they do because of no reason at all. On the basis of the rejection of this principle, the existence of brute facts, i.e., the existence of something with no cause or reason or productive principle, might be acceptable. Recently, some scholars such as Della Rocca (2018, 2021), Schrenk (2021), Pruss (2006) have claimed that Hume rejects the PSR when he uses the separability principle i.e., “everything which is different is separable” to show that causal maxim―“whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence” (T1.3.3.1)—is not intuitively or demonstratively certain. In this paper, I will show that Hume’s arguments against the
causal maxim do not refute the PSR but rather two specific conceptions of it: one that takes it as an a priori truth―intuitive or demonstratively certain―and another that takes the “efficient cause” as an intelligible notion.
Perinetti: Desire and Satisfaction: Understanding Hume’s Sceptical Strategy
This paper focuses on three puzzling claims advanced in à Hume’s Introduction to his Treatise. Hume claims that we should despair of ultimate explanations of the mind and criticizes philosophers seeking such explanations. These philosophers betray (1) an ignorance of “what is naturally satisfactory to the mind of man.” For (2) despair has the same effect as satisfaction. For (3) recognizing the impossibility of satisfying a desire causes the desire to “vanish.” These claims are puzzling; despair does not intuitively feel like satisfaction, and it seems false that knowing the impossibility of satisfying a desire causes its
disappearance. It is also unclear why philosophers seeking ultimate fail to understand epistemic satisfaction. I will argue that these puzzling claims only make sense when we view Hume’s sceptical strategy as a form of conceptual scepticism, mainly directed at challenging the intelligibility, not the knowability, of metaphysical beliefs. Understanding that e.g. the notion of a substantial mind implies contradictions leads to the acknowledging that such object is unintelligible depriving our epistemic desire to know such substance of its object; and, causing thus the extinction of the desire (3). Hume’s
conceptual scepticism does not, however, consist in simply “dissolving” metaphysical anxieties. By paying attention to the psychology of despair, certainty, and satisfaction—as discussed in Book II of the Treatise—I will make sense of the first and second puzzling claims and show that Hume’s sceptical strategy leads to an investigation of the underlying principles of human nature that lead to these
misguided desires, with the aim of redirecting them towards objects that can truly satisfy them.
Quinto: Hume on Wisdom: An umbrella concept between “Sapienta” and “Prudentia”
This paper aims to provide an original perspective on the concept of wisdom in David Hume’s moral philosophy. I will develop my position in two sections. In the first, I address a preliminary issue about the
existence and the role of a concept of wisdom in Hume’s philosophy. I argue for an increasing interest and centrality of wisdom in Hume’s ethics. In later works, such as History of England or A Dissertation on the Passions, Hume stresses that good character and conduct have much to do with wisdom, which is understood as experience and knowledge but also as balance and moderation of passions. In the second section, I will outline the main elements of Humean wisdom emerging from the analysis of the words ‘wise’, ‘wisdom’ and ‘sage’ used to describe a range of character’s qualities which have to do with reason, moderation and the capacity to take good practical choices. Hence, I argue that Hume does not clearly differentiate between intellectual and practical wisdom, mixing what Cicero calls «Sapientia» as knowledge or demonstrative reason and «Prudentia» as practical wisdom. This ambiguity results in a loose use of wisdom and prudence, which means the quality of good theoretical and practical evaluation.
Raynor: The Origins of Hume’s Philosophy
This paper seeks to answer several questions about the origin of Hume’s mature philosophy. What was he up to during his years at college, and the following nine years afterwards? When did his interest in philosophy begin? Did he ever subscribe to any form of Stoicism? What attracted him to Virgil’s Georgics? What impact did Cicero’s philosophical works have on him? What was Hume’s “new scene of thought”?
Royles: Personal Identity Tranquilized by Passion: Becoming Active in Hume
David Hume advances two contradictory theories of personal identity in A Treatise of Human Nature. In Book One Hume claims that the self does not exist since one cannot have an idea of it. However, in Book Two Hume maintains that we can have an idea of the self; furthermore, this idea plays a pivotal role in the formation of the indirect passions and the feeling of sympathy. I investigate how and if Hume reconciles these diverging conceptions of self-identity, finding that Hume’s turn towards the passionate and active self in the conclusion of Book One and in subsequent books resolves his skeptical problem of fractured identity. Hume’s solution is to ground the self in the passions and the actions motivated by them—that is, becoming active—experiencing lively impressions and acting naturally in the “common course of life.” I draw on Annette Baier, Norman Kemp Smith, and Elizabeth Radcliffe’s readings of Hume to support my claim that the key to solving Hume’s “Labyrinth” of personal identity lies in the passions. I disagree, however, that this approach undermines his skepticism, arguing instead that the tranquility arising from natural belief is a product of Hume’s Pyrrhonianism, not an escape from it.
Zahorodniuk: The most progressive part of Hume’s theory: The Soviet version
Hume’s philosophy of religion has a long history of beingcalled atheistic. The Soviet Union was one of the rareofficially atheistic countries. What could be a bettermatch? Yet, the Soviet historians of philosophy werereluctant to assess Hume’s theory as atheistic – on thecontrary, they claimed that Hume indirectly supportedreligion by his deistic position on God’s existence. Theyalso stated that Hume’s deism is inconsistent with hisskepticism. Interestingly, Paul Russell makes an exactlyopposing claim – that Hume was an atheist owing to hisskepticism. In this article, I will explore both positionsand show that the anti-dogmatic nature of Hume’s skepticism– which is fundamentally opposed to the dogmaticMarxism-Leninism – was the real reason for such position ofthe Soviet historians of philosophy.
Zhao: Language and Determination in Hume’s Demonstrative Inference
This paper examines the distinction between two types of determination in Hume’s philosophy: the causal determination of vivid perceptions and the conditional determination of demonstrative inferences. It argues that demonstrative inferences are grounded in linguistic rules derived from intuitions, leading to a conditional determination; that is, the mind is determined to accept a conclusion only if it strictly follows these rules. This differs from causal determination, where the mind is causally compelled to accept certain vivid perceptions without deviation. Besides, this paper addresses several challenges with the view that demonstrative inference is merely a series of intuitions of particular ideas. It proposes solutions to three main problems: (1) the conception of impossible objects, which challenges the
Conceivability Principle; (2) the nature of general appearances in geometry, as general appearances are
idealised beyond intuitions of particular ideas; and (3) the difficulty of inferring relationships in large
numerical calculations, which intuition alone cannot fully resolve.